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29 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : NRO Security
(Release of Information)

1. This memorandum is for information only.

2. Reference is made to your request of this date for an assessment of the damage caused by the release of information which appeared in the Washington Post, Monday, 29 July 1963 under caption, "AF Capsule Recoveries Now Routine."

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3. Conferences with Mr. Eugene Kiefer, D/DNRO, [REDACTED] Chief, NRO Staff, and others on 29 July 1963 confirmed that the provisions of the DOD Directive S-5200.13 dated 23 March 1963 titled: "Security and Public Information Policy for Military Space Programs" are being followed within DOD and the respective services. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) is the single office for news release approvals, and the NRO is being advised and coordinates on news items for releases which are applicable to the NRO type activity.

25X1A

4. The particular news release referenced in paragraph 2 was coordinated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) with the NRO Staff. The release was not coordinated with the CIA. Action was taken by this Office to insure that any future releases involving NRO matters will be coordinated with this Office.

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

5. The NRO Staff felt that the release did not compromise classified information under the spirit of the DOD Directive, as it did not:

- a. Identify past, present, or future planning of launches of space vehicles or specific recoveries thereof,

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
NRO and OSD review(s) completed.

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
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b. Describe success of retrievals in terms of specific numbers. These were published as percentages only.

6. NRO officials stated that several years ago the press contained information and photographs of capsule recoveries. They stated that the opposition has had the capability of augmenting this information over the years by monitoring communication traffic within the recovery area. Although certain of this traffic is coded, monitoring of this activity with special discernment as to the volume of traffic and the timing of events would serve to keep the opposition informed of successful recoveries. NRO officials advised that in their opinion this release was desirable because it served to relieve the pressures placed by news people in the Honolulu area.

7. Although the instant release does not appear to have damaged the security of the NRO program, it is the opinion of this Office that the public release of information relating to satellites or reconnaissance programs, tends to arouse speculation as to the state of our space efforts and the type of payloads being orbited; thus eroding the security of our activities. The press has such a wealth of information regarding past activities, especially those relating to the SAMOS and MIDAS systems, that a release, is quite likely to include added data by the reporter which reflects the probabilities of intelligence collection. Releases in general also tend to erode the security of the space mission by causing contractors and contractor personnel to believe that the security bars are being lifted.

8. As of this date there are no additional releases pending approval. We are reviewing this entire area of news releases in connection with NRO activities. The results will be contained in a subsequent memorandum to you.



K. L. Bannerman
Director of Security

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March 23, 1962
NUMBER S-5200.13

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT Security and Public Information Policy for Military
Space Programs (S)

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This directive establishes security and public information policy for military space programs and is applicable to all components of the Department of Defense.

II. GENERAL POLICY

- A. Adequate protection of military space programs is vital to the security of the United States. This requires the capability to launch, control, and recover space vehicles without public knowledge of the timing of these actions or of the specific mission involved. It is impractical to selectively protect certain military space programs while continuing an open launch policy for others since to do would emphasize sensitive projects.
- B. The security principle of need-to-know for military space projects must be vigorously enforced within DoD, DoD advisory groups, and by Defense contractors.
- C. Rigorous care must be taken to insure that information revealing the identification, mission, scope, or capability of specific military space projects and programs does not appear in unclassified documents and presentations.
- D. Unauthorized public discussion by Defense and Defense contractor personnel of the results, effectiveness, capabilities, and potentialities of specific military space projects and programs must be eliminated.

III. PROCEDURES

- A. Military space projects and space vehicles henceforth will be identified by means of numerical and alphabetical designators selected and assigned at random; except for boosters, names or nicknames no longer will be used.
 - 1. Military space projects will be identified by a numerical designator.
 - 2. Military space vehicles will be identified by an alphabetical prefix followed by a number designator, such as Orbital Vehicle (OV-7), Final State Vehicle (FSV-2), etc.
- B. The new method of identifying military space vehicles and projects will not be associated with their payload or mission except under the most strict security procedures and will be published in as few documents as possible. Titles of project documents will not refer to the mission or payload associated with the project. Launch or recovery schedules and funding for specific payloads or mission areas will be classified SECRET or higher.
- C. All public information news releases on military space programs will be cleared through a single office, and normally no releases will be made until after experiments have been conducted and after preliminary analyses of data have been completed.
- D. Preparation and dissemination of over-all reports, development plans, and other documents on military space projects and programs will be severely limited and controlled. Detailed need-to-know justification will be required on the basis of need for specific information, rather than for particular documents. The number of persons authorized a blanket need-to-know will be sharply curtailed and continuously controlled.

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IV. RESPONSIBILITIES

- A. The heads of all DoD components having responsibilities for military space projects and programs are responsible for insuring adherence to the provisions of this directive.
- B. The Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for:
 - 1. Determining and assigning identification nomenclature for all military space projects and vehicles.
 - 2. Maintaining a central registry of all military space project numbers and space vehicle designators.
- C. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) is responsible for maintaining the single office through which all public information news releases on DoD space projects and programs will be cleared.
- D. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for developing and issuing program and budgetary guidance consistent with the provisions of this directive.

V. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

- A. This directive is effective immediately. Existing documentation on military space projects and programs will be superseded by new documents as rapidly as they can be prepared and issued.
- B. Every component of the Department will revise its regulations and other instructions to conform with the provisions of this directive.

Deputy Secretary of Defense

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